Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience

Forthcoming in John Benjamins, in the series Advances in Consciousness Research (series editor M. Stamenov).

Table of contents:

• S. Edelman, T. Fekete, and N. Zach — Introduction

Part I. The dynamics of experience: possible brain mechanisms and computational considerations

• D. Lloyd — Time after time: temporality in the dynamic brain
• R. Malach — Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
• B. Merker — From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience
• S. Edelman and T. Fekete — Being in time

Part II. The dynamics of experience: theoretical implications

• T. Fekete and S. Edelman — The (lack of) mental life of some machines
• C. van Leeuwen and D. Smit — Restless minds, wandering brains
• S. Huette and M. J. Spivey — Fuzzy consciousness

Part III. The dynamics of experience: a philosophical perspective

• J. Yoshimi — Two dynamical themes in Husserl
• W. Wiese and T. Metzinger — Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness: first steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness
• R. Brown — The brain and its states
• R. A. Dale, D. P. Tollefsen, and C. T. Kello — An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness